GUIDELINE

MDG 2007

Guideline for the selection and implementation of collision management systems for mining

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Acknowledgements

The constructive evaluation and input provided by the Mining Equipment/Personnel Interaction Advisory Group (MEPIAG) working group members is gratefully acknowledged in the development of this guideline. We wish to thank the Coal Safety Advisory Committee for its most welcome support of this publication.

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Foreword

The working group was formed at the completion of work that was done by the Remote Controlled Equipment Advisory Group (RCEAG), which was originally charged with reviewing MDG 5002 *Guidelines for the use of remote controlled mining equipment* that was developed following a review into mine safety commissioned by the then NSW Minister for Mineral Resources, the Hon Bob Martin MP, in November 1996. The original guideline was developed by Task Group One and was first published in February 1998.

RCEAG was formed in 2002 with representatives from underground coal operators, unions, equipment suppliers, NSW Mine Safety and the Department of Natural Resources and Mines QLD. The scope and purpose of RCEAG was to develop industry guidelines associated with the use of remote control equipment used in mining.

The working group was reformed in 2011 and retitled the Mining Equipment, Personnel Interaction Advisory Group (MEPIAG) to develop guidance material associated with interaction of people, infrastructure and equipment. The group consists of representatives from underground coal operators, unions, equipment suppliers, NSW Mine Safety and the Department of Natural Resources and Mines QLD.

Acknowledgement is given by the working group to AngloAmerican and Glencore Xstrata for allowing use of material to allow development of this publication.

As technology advances and is used in mines the risk profile changes. It is not the intention of the working group to stifle or restrict technological advancement, but to assist with maintaining ALARP for the industry and assisting operators and designers of plant to establish common ground.

Functions of MEPIAG

The scope of the MEPIAG is to advise industry on:
- the management of interaction risks to personnel, infrastructure and equipment during mining operations.
- the implementation of proximity detection/collision management systems to minimise risks to personnel, infrastructure plant and equipment.
- and act as a forum for mining operators, employee bodies, equipment suppliers and regulators to work together to improve safety in this dynamic environment.
- focussing on all types of mining (underground, surface, coal, metalliferous and extractive).

Core activities for MEPIAG

The group will undertake the following activities:
- Participate in the review of legislation, standards and guidelines.
- Monitor the implementation of proximity detection systems and new technology in this area.
- Review any significant incidents relating to collisions and near misses reported to a regulatory authority as required.
- Develop guidance material relevant to the scope.
- Effectively communicate its activities to industry.
- Advise regulatory authorities as required.
MDG 2007, *Guideline for the selection and implementation of collision management systems for mining* was developed by an industry working group coordinated by the MEPIAG sub-committee. The working group consisted of representatives from a number of mines in NSW, equipment suppliers/maintainers, unions, NSW Trade & Investment and Department Natural Resources and Mines Qld. Their constructive evaluation and input into the development of this guideline is gratefully acknowledged. This is a ‘published guideline’. Further information on the status of a published guideline in the range of WHS instruments is available through NSW Trade & Investment – Mine Safety, Legislation. The range of instruments includes:

- Regulations made under the Acts.
- conditions of exemption or approval.
- approved industry Codes of Practice (under the WH&S Act).
- applied guidelines.
- published guidelines.
- Guidance Notes.
- Technical Reference documents.
- Safety Alerts.

MDG 2007, *Guideline for the selection and implementation of collision management systems for mining*, was distributed to industry for consultation and comment through a representative working group, the Coal Safety Advisory Committee, NSW Metalliferous Industry Safety Advisory Committee (MISAC) and the Mining Equipment Personnel Interaction Advisory Group.

Signed
Rob Regan

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1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1.1 TITLE

This MDG 2007 the *Guideline for the selection and implementation of collision management systems in mining* has been developed for use by coal mines, metalliferous mines and quarries (referred to in this guideline as mines).

Purpose and scope

The purpose of this guideline is to provide information to assist in applying an appropriate methodology to define, select and implement a collision management system suitable for the mine and may be used to review the system in operation.

The scope of this guideline is limited to providing guidance for an operator to select and implement a suitable system for their operation as well as providing consistency across the mining industry.

This guideline applies to equipment used in mines that interacts with people, other equipment and infrastructure.

It is important to note that:

1. adherence to guidelines does not itself assure compliance with the general duty of care.
2. mine operators deviating from guidelines should document a risk assessment supporting the alternative arrangements.
3. these guidelines have been developed by an industry working group with representation from all stakeholders. The working group has deliberated over ideas and suggestions and recognises that some operators could have other ideologies.
4. this guideline defines a minimum recommended approach to the selection of a suitable collision management system for a mine. Mines are encouraged to look at their applications and provide systems that are suitable for each mine.

1.2 DEFINITIONS

The following definitions apply to this technology:

**ALARA**

As Low As Reasonably Achievable

**ALARP**

As Low As Reasonably Practicable

The level of risk between tolerable and intolerable levels that can be achieved without expenditure of a disproportionate cost in relation to the benefit gained.

**Behaviour zones**

Behaviour zones are dynamically sized zones based on the situation of the plant. These behaviour zones are defined independently of the detection zones while still considering the abilities/limitations of the sensing technologies.

**CAS**

Collision Avoidance System

The combination of technologies (i.e. SAT, PAT, PDT & CAT) that form a system.
CAT  
Collision Avoidance Technology  
Technology or device/s that actively scan for other vehicles or personnel and take automatic action to render the equipment to a safe state (e.g. reversing radar with brake control).

CAT zone  
The CAT zone is the area in which CAT is primarily required to operate. PDT and PAT may overlap this zone. CAT zones are identified in these series of documents in red colouring.

Collision Management System  
A collective name for the preventative and mitigating controls that reduce the frequency of collision situations and the level of risk to as low as reasonably practicable/achievable (ALARP).

CWA  
Controlled Work Area  
An area, defined by a site-specific risk assessment, where trained people can enter to work and operate the machine. This type of control is considered to be low on the hierarchy of controls. A collision awareness system will elevate the controls within the hierarchy of controls (Figure 1).

Detection zones  
Detection zones are defined as the range of the sensing technology. For example, an electromagnetic field zone may only cover a few metres from the machine while a UHF signal may cover up to 100 m. It is of very high importance that the mine has an understanding of the abilities and limitations of each sensor type being used to determine proximity. A detection zone should be identified for each sensing technology used.

E/E/PES  
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic System for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more electrical/electronic programmable electronic devices, including all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices. (AS61508)

EUC  
Equipment Under Control (AS61508).  
Equipment, machinery, apparatus or plant used for manufacturing, process, transportation, medical or other activities.

Functional safety  
Part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and the EUC control system that depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PES safety related systems, other technology safety related systems and external risk reduction facilities. (AS61508)

Interaction  
An intentional or unintentional close encounter between two or more objects. This may be:  
- equipment to personnel  
- equipment to equipment  
- equipment to infrastructure.

Integrated system  
The process of bringing together the component subsystems into one system and ensuring that the subsystems function together in a system.

Mine  
Refers to the following types of operations:  
- underground coal mine  
- surface coal mine  
- underground metalliferous mine  
- surface metalliferous mine  
- extractive operations (quarries).
Mobile equipment
Includes all equipment that can move under its own power on wheels, crawler tracks or rails.

Moveable plant
Plant that is mounted on skid plates and is normally stationary but can move under its own power using a walking mechanism, external hydraulic supply or by cable winch. (e.g. dragline, longwall roof support).

OEM
Original Equipment Manufacturer.
The OEM referred to in this MDG might refer to the manufacturer of the host mobile machine or the manufacturer of the collision management system that may be two or more separate parties.

PAT
Proximity Awareness Technology
Technologies that help to identify they are converging to another vehicle, person or infrastructure (e.g. reversing mirrors, flashing lights, reversing sirens).

PAT zone
The PAT zone is the area in which PAT is primarily required to operate. PAT zones are identified in these series of documents with yellow colouring.

PDT
Proximity Detection Technology
Technologies or devices that actively scan for other vehicles or personnel and warn of their presence. This technology does not automatically take action to prevent a collision (e.g. reversing camera with distance alarm, RFV tags, laser scanner, radar).

PDT zone
The PDT zone is the area in which PDT is primarily required to operate. PAT zones might overlap this zone. PDT zones are identified in these series of documents with orange colouring.

PL
Performance Level – An expression used to define how well a safety system is able to perform a safety function under foreseeable conditions.

Pre-engineered system
A system that has been constructed of or using prefabricated components or parts.

Qualified functional safety practitioner
- A person certified under an internationally recognised scheme recognised for functional safety practitioners or
- A person with knowledge and experience of functional safety and knowledge and experience in conducting risk assessment involving functional safety.

Safety function
Function to be implemented by a safety-related control system, other technology-related system or external risk reduction facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC, in respect of a hazardous event. (AS61508)

Safety requirement specifications
Specification containing all the requirements of the safety functions that has to be performed by the safety-related systems. (AS61508)

SAT
Safety Adherence Technology
Technologies that track and record the operation and performance of equipment for post-event analysis and training (e.g. SCADA systems, event databases, chart recorders).

SCADA
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.
It refers to industrial computer systems that monitor and control industrial, infrastructure, or facility-based processes.

**SIL**
Safety Integrity Level.
Discrete level (one out of a possible four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety-related systems, where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level and safety integrity level 1 has the lowest. (AS61508)

**SOP**
Standard Operating Procedure

**Stationary plant**
Plant that cannot move under its own power and may be either fixed or relocatable from time-to-time using other equipment (e.g. portable lighting tower, generator set, pit pump, DCB).

**Void (No-Go)**
In some instances, mobile equipment and personnel might be prohibited from entering areas that might include:
- unstable ground
- open stopes
- highwalls
- out-of-bounds areas around machines
- blast zones
- other off limit areas.

**Worker**
Refer to relevant state legislation for the definition of “worker”

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### 2. INTRODUCTION

#### 2.1 CONTEXT

Industry has developed this publication based on the number of fatalities, serious bodily injuries and near misses that have occurred globally in the mining industry.

This guideline is intended to assist operators in the decision-making process of selecting a collision management system.

It is important that the user of this publication notes:

a) The decision process needs to consider interactions between:
   - equipment to personnel
   - equipment to equipment and
   - equipment to infrastructure.

   **Note:** Throughout this publication the three interactions listed above are referred to as interactions.

b) The collision management system needs to provide additional layers of protection to reduce the risk of collision interaction where other types of controls are not effective or impractical to apply. It is not intended that the system replaces existing administrative controls (e.g. induction, training etc.) but will be elevated within the hierarchy of controls (refer to Figure 1) to ensure that the risks associated with interactions are As Low As Reasonably Practicable.

c) The collision management system needs to consider the use of functional safety standards in relation to safeguards through the design, implementation and operation with appropriate safety integrity. (e.g. where the system has been designed and manufactured based on SIL assessment principles but has not had formal SIL rating applied, the documented
For integrated systems, the following information shall be provided to the machine operator:

- Assurance of what functional safety standard has been used.
- Identification of safety critical systems and components of those systems.
- Documentation of what tasks need to be undertaken to maintain system integrity across the lifecycle of the system.

For non-integrated systems the commissioner of that system is solely responsible for the system functional safety performance.

d) The working group highly recommends that a functional safety approach in the application of collision management systems is applied throughout the equipment’s life cycle. This approach will provide a safety assessment of all aspects of the system including integration of multiple sub systems to form the overall system.

Where safety critical aspects of a third party system have been identified during the machine risk assessment, a suitably qualified functional safety practitioner should be engaged to assist in the assessment of the design.

Third party collision management systems might impair the existing safety functions on the host equipment. The OEM should be consulted to determine the impact on these safety functions, if any, and their significance.

e) Risk management practices used are consistent with the methods already in use at the mine or that these practices should be improved to cater for analysis of collision management systems.

f) MEPIAG understands that technology is continually emerging and users need to be aware of the changes and advances in technology.

g) It is expected that where more than one OEM is involved, that all OEMs will interact and clearly document roles, responsibilities and boundaries for each party to achieve a safe outcome.

1. Eliminate the hazard
2. Substitute/minimise
3. Isolation from people
4. Engineering control
   - redesign
   - enclose
   - limit switches
   - redundancy
5. Administrative controls
   - Safe Work Procedures
   - Training
   - Warning devices
6. Personnel Protective Equipment
   (Last line of defence).

Figure 1 – Hierarchy of controls
2.2 INTENT OF COLLISION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The intent is to reduce overall operating risk by:

a) recording all interactions and events for analysis so the mine can use the captured data to analyse the effectiveness of the system. This analysis allows the management of excessive alarming during the implementation and operation of the system (applies to PDT and CAT only).

b) providing additional information to personnel on the proximity of equipment, infrastructure and personnel in the surrounding area (applies to PAT/PDT/CAT)

c) alerting people to interactions that might be unsafe to allow them to take corrective action (applies to PDT and CAT only)

d) intervening and taking some form of control to prevent an unsafe event through appropriate risk management practices in the event of a dangerous interaction to prevent an unsafe event provided that the control can be applied safely and the overall risk is reduced through appropriate risk management practices (applies to CAT only).

2.3 PURPOSE

This document describes a methodology for defining a collision management system for a mine or mines.

It also provides guidance to assist mines to incorporate appropriate functional safety requirements into the scope of works to ensure that the system functions correctly and reliably throughout its life cycle. Consideration of integration into pre-existing systems needs to be assessed by each mine, based on the type of plant/equipment that is being proposed.
3. PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING COLLISION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

This section provides guidance material for a mine to establish a collision management system suited to the operation. Integrated throughout the process are varying risks that need to be assessed and controlled. The goal of any system is to strive for zero harm (Refer to Figure 2).

Systems identified in Figure 3 should, where appropriate, be developed and expanded in consultation with workers.

Notes:

1. Risk assessment referred to throughout this document generally refers to the assessments completed by the mine to understand the basis and requirements of the intended system.

2. In consultation with designers, manufacturers and installers the mine should participate in completion of risk assessments at the various life cycle phases of the host machine and collision management system to ensure that the level of risk is ALARP.

3. During the design of their system, OEMS are still required to assess their system for appropriate safety integrity and functionality.

4. At a mine, different mining applications should be individually assessed as the risks can vary, which affects the functionality of the system.

3.1 RISK MANAGEMENT

3.1.1 General

Collision management systems have been introduced to primarily improve safety by reducing unsafe interactions. The system design should support/complement existing controls and not replace these controls. Equipment Under Control (EUC) can expose workers to risks such as being run over, equipment becoming out of control and impacts from other equipment and ergonomic factors resulting in injury or death. This recognition of introducing different hazards and increasing the risk from traditional hazards requires a systematic risk-based approach to adequately manage the changes.

Management systems for the use of EUC should be integrated into the Mine Safety Management Plan (MSMP) and be based on a risk management approach to safety. Users of this guideline should refer to AS/NZS ISO 31000 risk management – principles and guidelines for more information.

This guideline should be considered when developing risk controls and safe work systems for collision management systems.

Procedures for monitoring and evaluating the entire mining process and environment should be developed as an initial part of developing safe work systems and procedures. That is, no system/procedure is complete without an established monitoring, evaluation, audit and review process.

A risk management approach involving a cross section of the workers at the mine should determine safe working systems for the use of mining equipment. All risks associated with the use of mining equipment should be identified, assessed and eliminated or adequately controlled using the hierarchy of controls (Figure 1).
3.1.2 Risk assessment

The primary objectives of a risk-based analysis are to:

1. identify and prioritise any additional hazards or issues that could arise during the life cycle of a collision management system deployment.
2. confirm there were no omissions or oversights in the recommended controls put forward by the various members of the risk assessment team.
3. provide material that will suit a guidance document/starter kit for organisations considering proximity detection – issues to consider and design parameters.
4. provide guidance material on integrating a proximity detection system into an operating mine.

Many operations are exploring the potential of introducing proximity detection. The benefits of avoiding predictable human errors in respect to positioning around machinery by warning personnel or slowing/stoppage machinery movements can provide an engineered solution to a hazard (or unwanted event). A number of studies have been completed in this area, including MDG 5004, A study of the risky positioning behaviour of operators of remote control mining equipment.

An independent facilitator has guided the working group through a risk analysis process. It is important to consider that the outcomes of this risk analysis are:

- process driven and challenge current thinking and may not necessarily appear appropriate or reflect “pre-conceived” ideas
- the result of the team review of the topic and not the results of any one individual or organisation.

It is essential to constantly challenge the underlying assumptions, current and recommended controls of any risk assessment – it is a “living process” and not a one-off exercise.

Appendix 5 lists the outcomes from the MEPIAG risk assessment.
Figure 2 – Road to zero harm
Collision avoidance system identified as potential additional control

Risk assessment scope

Conduct risk assessment

Apply conventional controls

Define level of intervention to manage residual risks

Decision on which technology to apply ie SAT, PAT, PDT or CAT

Develop functional specification

• Functions
• Safety zones
• Interventions
• Modes of Operation

Tender/evaluation process

Change management process

Includes risk assessment with new controls, gaps to specification, human factors. Complete gap analysis and manage residual risks.

Installation

Commissioning

Ongoing system monitoring/ enhancing

Collision avoidance technology

Intervention

How is equipment to be

What if there is a systems failure?

Due to control being taken by the system, functional safety and SIL/PL should be incorporated into the application

As these controls still rely on operators to take action, SIL/PL rating may not be relevant but functional safety still needs to be considered in design

Proximity detection technology

Detection system

PAT, PDT

Camera, audio/visual

Types of interactions: Equipment to person, equipment to equipment, equipment to infrastructure, equipment to plant (fixed and mobile). Review RISKGATE/industry risk assessment.

Based on risk assessment and available equipment (ie ALARP/ALARA)

Existing controls: Traffic rules, No-Go zones, road designs, competent people, engineering specifications

Develop scenarios: Assess the scenarios to identify residual risks and how these risks will be controlled

Risk assessment scope

Conduct risk assessment

Apply conventional controls

Define level of intervention to manage residual risks

Decision on which technology to apply ie SAT, PAT, PDT or CAT

Develop functional specification

• Functions
• Safety zones
• Interventions
• Modes of Operation

Tender/evaluation process

Change management process

Includes risk assessment with new controls, gaps to specification, human factors. Complete gap analysis and manage residual risks.

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What if there is a systems failure?

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Proximity detection technology

Detection system

PAT, PDT

Camera, audio/visual

Figure 3: Development process
3.2 Define Level of Intervention

Available systems have varying levels of intervention. Through a risk management approach, the mine operator should conduct a risk assessment considering the frequency of exposure and serious potential collision outcome to identify the balance required between CAT and PDT that should be applied. The two main levels are:

1. proximity detection (operator made aware of a situation – soft control Figure 1) and
2. collision avoidance (machine intervenes to prevent impact – hard control Figure 1).

In the design, the system might require a combination of technologies to achieve a complete collision management system.

1. A PAT system is used to prevent potentially dangerous interactions from occurring by providing additional information to personnel on the equipment and personnel in the surrounding area.
2. A PDT system is used in the event of a potentially dangerous interaction to automatically generate alarms that instruct personnel to take corrective action to avoid a collision.
3. A CAT system is used in the event of a potentially dangerous interaction to automatically take appropriate control of equipment to avoid an adverse outcome based on the outcomes of the mine’s risk assessment.

Examples of ‘safety related’ components of a collision management system could include:

- PAT system: mirrors, reversing siren, horn, flashing light
- PDT system: camera, radar sensor, laser scanner, RF/EM transmitter and receiver
- CAT system: any component.

Often, the highest risk interaction category is equipment to people. To best manage this area of risk, implementing the hierarchy of controls should, if possible, be at the engineering level or higher (refer to Figure 1).

A detailed risk assessment associated with the full life cycle of the collision management system should be undertaken to evaluate and manage existing and new potential risks to people, plant, equipment and infrastructure at the mine.

3.3 Areas of Interaction

It is considered that three areas of interaction that should be considered during the design of a system (refer to Table 1).

1. Equipment to people.
2. Equipment to equipment.
3. Equipment to infrastructure (e.g. overhead powerlines, buildings, process plant, other types of plant etc.).
3.4 Defining the Function of the System

In considering the three areas of interaction, the operator should clearly define what functionality the system should provide to workers at the mine to reduce risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

Where appropriate, the mine should ensure that designers identify safety critical components of the system so that the mine can determine a quantifiable level of risk to workers.

Safety critical functions should be identified by the designer and end user while defining the functionality of the system. The required Safety Integrity Level (SIL) or Performance Level (PL) should then be determined by the original equipment manufacturer using life cycle considerations.

Where interfacing of a system with existing systems is to occur, then the entire system, including the interface, must be considered during the functional safety assessment.

In the event that SIL/PL is unable to be assigned, other risk mitigation methods need to be specified.

Note: Technical guidance for the design of proximity detection systems should come from one of the functional safety standards listed in Appendix 5.

The mine should give consideration to how hire plant and equipment fitted with a collision management system can be/will be integrated into the mine’s system/s. (e.g. contractor plant and equipment, hire equipment).

3.5 Defining the Safety Zones

It is important to distinguish between detection zone minimum requirements (the actual sensing technology); and the changing, dynamic behaviour that needs to occur upon detection in different situations.

There are three specific behaviour zones defined in this guideline:

- Stop zone – the object is within critical range of the plant given the current operational situation.
- Alarm zone – the object is within an alarm range of the plant given the current operational situation.
- Alert zone – the object is within an alert range.

The relationship of these zones is shown in Appendix 1 and 2.

While defining safety zones, the following factors should be considered:

1. speed and direction of travel of EUC
2. location of workers
3. operating conditions
4. operating environment
5. location of EUC operators
6. visibility from EUC operators’ position.
7. operation of machine (e.g. remote control, onboard, tele-remote, autonomous)
8. “demand load” on the system. (This is the likely frequency of potential interactions – so that an area such as a working production area would have a higher level of technology applied due to the increased interactions than in a working area that is less frequented or remote where the area is
infrequently populated.) This should also be considered during the functional safety analysis.

9. Latency of system should be considered as the response time and ability to handle detection of multiple hazards by the CATs as well as the response time of the EUC, such as delays resulting from hydraulic system flow rates, brake wear, tyre size etc.

10. During the defining of the detection/protection zones, consideration should be given to the dynamic shape of zones under all operational scenarios. As an example, the zone around an articulating type machine (loader, continuous miner) might need to adjust with the machine’s size, lateral movement, articulation or the swing radius.

3.6 Developing Scope for System

The operator should develop a scope of work for the supply of system/s as defined by the mine. The scope should include items that the operator considers are mandatory and those that are optional. In developing the scope, consideration should be given to future technological advances and integration into other mine systems.

In developing the scope, the following information should be included:

1. Level or levels of intervention
2. How functional safety is to be treated and maintained through the equipment’s life cycle
3. Identification of safety critical functions
4. Site specific requirements
5. Ability to interface with other systems
6. Limitations associated with operating conditions
7. Testing, commissioning and verification requirements
8. Certification documentation (where applicable)
9. Ability to accept future technology (future proofing)
10. Ability to record and log events for retrieval
11. Maximum scan time and reaction time of system or output events
12. Notification from the supplier/s of
   a. residual risk and/or,
   b. limitations associated with the supplied system/s or any of its components,
   c. ability to override a system/s in the event of a system/component failure to make the equipment safe.
   d. system 'self-test' functions.
   e. system safety zone range, accuracy and polar coverage.

3.7 Override for Emergency Recovery

A collision avoidance system might have provision to be overridden in the event of an emergency for recovery of the machine. Override shall allow the machine to be operated with limited functionality to allow recovery from areas of risk to personnel, e.g. unsupported areas, impact zones.
The mine should identify potential emergency recovery scenarios by applying team-based risk management practices and specify any conditions that could require the collision avoidance system to be overridden conditions.

It will be necessary to implement rigorous controls for the use of override facilities. The manufacturer/supplier of the equipment should provide recommendations on the administrative controls based on the equipment risk assessment. These recommendations should then be evaluated by the end user in relation to their specific operating conditions.

### 3.8 Change Management

The mine/corporate philosophy surrounding change management should be applied to achieve safe outcomes.

### 3.9 Installation

Installation of a collision management system should be detailed in the mine’s risk assessment. It is recognised that more than one supplier could be used or more than one installer engaged. All activities associated with the installation should include:

1. Risk assessments (including interaction between work parties where required).
2. Full operation, maintenance and service documentation from suppliers. These documents should become part of the mine’s safety file.
3. Activities completed as prescribed in the suppliers’ documentation (typically including consideration of residual risk and procedure development).
4. A requirement to take into consideration the exposure of the system components to physical damage.
5. Mounting locations should consider:
   a. the effects of loss of signal integrity due to other physical constraints associated with the mounting location.
   b. effects on the operator through reduction in visibility associated with components of the system irrespective of mounting location.
   c. access to the components for cleaning, adjustment, maintenance etc.
6. The effect on the zones associated with components that are mounted on moveable structures (e.g. continuous miner boom (tail), dragline swing radius)
7. Design in consultation with the mine should determine the number of transmitters/sensing devices that should be mounted to provide adequate coverage.
8. Full commissioning tests should be completed and documented. This should include:
   a. documented test plan specific for the equipment/installation.
   b. validation that the mine’s requirements have been met.
   c. confirmation that RF signals do not affect other aspects of the operation, including controlling of machines.
9. For aftermarket systems, an assessment should be made on the impact the system will have on the existing machine. This includes EMC (component and system) and the effect on the functional safety of original control systems of the machine.

3.10 TRAINING

By incorporating collision management systems into EUC, the equipment operator/s and management are to be trained in the systems operations. The training plan should include:

- a training plan for the collision management system to be developed and maintained
- a process to ensure operators, supervisors and maintenance personnel are trained and competent to perform the tasks required of them in both normal and failed situations
- a documented and competency-based training assessment process with a practical and theoretical component
- a reassessment program
- records on each personnel file
- a way to ensure that the system is effective and fully operational.

3.11 COMMISSIONING

Before any equipment is forwarded to the mine, the mine should establish that:

- one person is appointed as the commissioning engineer. This may be an OEM or mine representative
- factory acceptance testing was completed
- the equipment is fit for the intended purpose
- the systems meets the mandatory requirements in line with the mine’s scope.

In situ commissioning should verify through documented processes that equipment operates as designed in its intended operating environment.

The process for commissioning needs to be developed based on the life cycle management process applicable to the equipment.

Note: Where the OEMs are in dispute, the mine should take the lead to commission the system with input from all OEMs. The process should be fully integrated into one commissioning process to ensure full functionality of the system/s to provide a safe outcome.

3.12 MAINTENANCE

A maintenance system to ensure that the system and its components are operable and are within tolerance should be developed and implemented at the mine. The maintenance program needs to include items that will render the equipment un-usable due to the failure of a component associated with the system or a complete system malfunction. Where a CAT system has been incorporated into the EUC, the maintenance should extend to all peripheral items.
or systems to ensure that all aspects of the entire collision management system are fully functional (e.g. braking system).

### 3.13 System Health Monitoring and System Failure Procedure

The operating condition of the collision management system should be monitored on a regular basis to ensure that the system is fully functional. Ideally the collision management system should contain automatic health monitoring/diagnostics and report to the operator via an alarm when there is a failure. In the event of a system failure, the system should fail to a ‘safe state’.

The mine via risk assessment should define what components of the collision management system are classified as ‘safety critical’ that in the event of failure, the equipment needs to be placed out of service in accordance with the operator’s defect management system.

Any safety-related system components shall be validated to the design requirements.

### 3.14 Ongoing System Monitoring and Review

Equipment using a collision management system should be subject to an auditing/monitoring and review process. This should be part of the continual improvement process under the MSMP. This should include processes to:

- review all record keeping
- implement remedial action from hazard identification
- analyse results, routinely, after events or incidents/accidents involving collision management systems
- feed outcomes from analysis back into future planning and operational processes. (Information on past notifiable incidents or high potential incidents is available on government web pages.)
- integrate the monitoring and review of collision avoidance systems and procedures into the MSMP
- report system failures or operational issues back to the OEMs in a timely manner
- report unsafe events (notifiable incidents or high potential incidents) to the relevant state regulator as required by relevant state legislation
- monitor industry developments associated with collision management technologies.

Following an unplanned event, the site risk assessment should be reviewed to ensure that appropriate controls are in place to prevent a recurrence.

Periodical reviews of the system need to be completed irrespective of the occurrence of an unplanned event to ensure that risk is being adequately managed within acceptable limits throughout the collision management system life cycle.

### 3.15 Record Keeping and Documentation

The records and documentation of the design, planning, development (if applicable) and operation of mining equipment should be integrated with the MSMP document control system. Records may include:
risk assessments associated with the mine planning process
risk assessment reviews
OEM-provided design, operability and maintainability assessments
OEM-provided documentation on type approvals and certificates of conformity
OEM-provided information on operating limits (temperature, angles/positions, vibration limits, etc.)
the selection of a mining method that provides a safe work environment. This extends to the type/s of equipment selected for the chosen mining method.
SOPs for repeating or high risk activities
the equipment selection process and purchase details
operational checks
workplace inspections
testing, verification, modification, maintenance and decommissioning records for equipment and ancillary equipment
training and competency assessments
hazard reporting and follow-up
audit and monitoring records
disposal and other life cycle considerations
pro-forma documents for daily prestart and routine checks on equipment functionality – based on the risks identified.

The material collected in this manner should be controlled – ideally being kept in the plant safety file.
3.16 Future proofing

As part of any mine safety strategy, collision management systems will form an integral and important part of the overall safety design. It is therefore becoming increasingly important that the system is both well specified, and has an established level of intercommunication. The end user should consider the level of integration of each collision management system at the functional definition phase of the process.

Mines should consider when discussing systems with OEMs that the system is not locked into isolation i.e. it will not allow for integration with other systems.

Consideration should also be made regarding:

- integration with newer models
- intercommunication with newer devices.

4. Appendices

The information in these appendices should not be used on its own. It should be used in the context of using the whole of this guideline to provide input to site specific risk assessments to develop specific drawings for each mine.

This information has been provided by companies that have their own particular circumstances (mine layout, geological conditions, ventilation arrangements, workforce cultures, and competencies). The equipment types are not exhaustive but are intended to provide a representative sample of mining machines. This information has been provided as a sample by the MEPIAG and presented as generic samples only.

The dimensions ‘F’, ‘R’, ‘S’, ‘Ra’, ‘Rb’ and $\theta_c$ are to be developed by undertaking desktop engineering (e.g.: stopping distance calculations etc.) analysis and team-based risk assessments considering the type of machine, direction of travel, speed and level of protection required by the system.
Appendix 1 – Sample surface equipment zones

Note: The following drawings are to indicate zones associated with the use of proximity detection/collision avoidance technologies. Users also need to consider Go/No-Go Zones around machines.

Figure 4 – Stop zones for a dump truck travelling in a forward direction

Figure 5 – Stop zones for a dump truck travelling in a reverse direction

Figure 6 – Stop zones for a stationary truck

Figure 7 – Alarm zones for a dump truck

Figure 8 – Alert zones for a dump truck
Figure 9 – Stop zone for a dragline in boarding mode

Figure 10 – Stop zone for a dragline in walking, and maintenance modes

Figure 11 – Alarm zone for a dragline
Figure 12 – Alert zone for a dragline
Appendix 2 – Sample underground equipment zones

Note: The following drawings are to indicate zones associated with the use of proximity detection/collision avoidance technologies. Users also need to consider Go/No-Go Zones around underground machines. Detail to assist in deciding these locations can be referenced from AS/NZS 4240.3.

Figure 13 – Stop zone for a shuttle car

Figure 14 – Alarm zone for a shuttle car

Figure 15 – Alert zone for a shuttle car
Figure 16 – Stop zone for a continuous miner

Figure 17 – Alarm zone for a continuous miner

Figure 18 – Alert zone for a continuous miner
Appendix 3 – Sample hazard and zone requirement table

The following table is indicative only and each mine will need to develop its own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominated Hazard</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Technology</th>
<th>SAT</th>
<th>PAT</th>
<th>PDT</th>
<th>CAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zone</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Desired</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alarm</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stop</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIL / PL</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be determined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response Time</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant / Infrastructure</td>
<td>Zone</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Desired</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alarm</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stop</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIL / PL</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be determined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response Time</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile equipment</td>
<td>Zone</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Desired</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alarm</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stop</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIL / PL</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be determined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response Time</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td>&lt;1s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4 – Risk assessment

The approach taken by the MEPIAG team is that users should consider the use of proximity detection equipment broadly in line with that described in Figure 19 – with the notable exception that as the subject matter was purely related to EUC and that the matrix method of risk calculation could not be applied\(^1\) – and a more qualitative priority setting approach was used.

Any risk assessment completed should use the cross section of the workers at the mine, and other relevant stakeholders (e.g. OEMs, suppliers, installers) ensuring that all parties concerned understand the tolerable risk requirements of the mine.

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\(^1\) The process of analysing the risks in this sample assessment was not completed using a risk ranking methodology. The reason for not using a ranking approach was due to the team only identifying issues with potential for significant consequences.

MDG 2007 Guideline for the selection and implementation of collision management systems for mining
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Potential Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s dependence on system - people depending on the system and leading to complacency/reliance on the machine ceasing dangerous movement when they are in the wrong location. The hazards of total system reliance by operators. Don’t want a culture where people rely on proximity detection systems for their safety. Desire to have proximity detection systems to support current controls - not replace them.</td>
<td>people</td>
<td>Hazard awareness training. Training of personnel in proximity detection requirements. Go/No-Go zones. Transitional introduction of proximity detection (data collection (monitoring) - warning system - machine control). Incident response system for proximity detection breach of zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over alarming - desensitising of personnel (no thought in acknowledging alarms); system too sensitive (false alarms); multiple system alarms occurring simultaneously - too many lights/alarms. Proximity detection systems need to cause only the required interruptions to mining processes (no false trips).</td>
<td>people</td>
<td>Transitional introduction. Standardise Human Machine Interface (HMI) - consistent alarm sound and light. Minimise the number of alarms and implement shut down in consistent (hazardous) conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of zones and sizes. The required intervention for machines that operate at high speeds needs to be assessed (clashing effect of crash stops).</td>
<td>CWA</td>
<td>Realistic (not too large/too small) setting of zone sizes - with regard to the method of mining occurring and the mode of operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Speed of movement/operation of the Equipment Under Control (EUC). Tailored to the operation. Site specific operability/maintainability risk assessments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 See the definitions section for more detail and PE = People, EQ = Equipment and CWA = Controlled Work Area

MDG 2007 Guideline for the selection and implementation of collision management systems for mining
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Type*</th>
<th>Potential Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction/interface of systems (to achieve simplicity).</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Establish the framework at a broad brush risk assessment for proximity detection within the whole of mine system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to determine how different technology solutions will inter-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Site procedures adequately reflect the presence of (multiple/variable) proximity detection systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operate (different brands on same site).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Site specific operability/maintainability Risk Assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of proximity, non-proximity fitted machines.</td>
<td></td>
<td>OEMs developing a standardised interface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of equipment - visual; damage; effect of zones (does the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equipment move?).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The boundaries of proximity detection systems will likely be dynamic.</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Transitional introduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consider speeds of vehicles and response times/types.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Allow for variation in zone size required based on dimensional changes of vehicles (attachments, trailers, platforms etc.) and environmental conditions (floor conditions, grade etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis.</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Monitoring capability and storage of data from proximity detection systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempting to build a &quot;silver bullet&quot; technology solution.</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Sites to develop functional specifications based on risk assessment of their particular requirements and CWA geometries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of system.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing reasonable levels of safety in line with social values.</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Organisational risk management standards – ALARP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to avoid operators being in no go zone? Place changing may</td>
<td>CWA</td>
<td>Transitional introduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>require this - miner driver standing next to shuttle cars.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Site specific risk assessment as an input to functional specification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitors/pedestrians interacting with machines.</td>
<td>people</td>
<td>Functional specification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Site specific risk assessments to identify zone requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to determine the override functions of proximity detection</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Functional specification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>systems.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk assessment on running machinery with system defeated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making changes to the equipment.</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Change management system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power on maintenance.</td>
<td>people</td>
<td>Functional specification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk assessment on power on maintenance tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of alarm - where did the alarm originate?</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Monitoring capability and storage of data from proximity detection systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Functional specification on alarm logging, storage and display.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Type*</td>
<td>Potential Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What common terminology to adopt?</td>
<td>CWA</td>
<td>Addressed in guidelines. Change management for the move from Go/No-go zones to &quot;bubbles&quot; of proximity detection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine becomes stuck in unsupported strata location.</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td>Referred to site-specific processes for developing responses to unwanted operational conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor quality or flawed assessment of risks.</td>
<td>CWE</td>
<td>Site systems for reviewing and continuously improving assessment and management of risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training.</td>
<td>people</td>
<td>General control - should be a competency-based system of training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 5 – Links to references/associated documentation**

**LEGISLATION**

- Work Health and Safety Act 2011
- Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011
- Coal Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2006 (CMHS Regulation 2006)
- Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD)
- Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 (QLD)
- Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD)
- Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulations 2001 (QLD)


**AUSTRALIAN AND ISO STANDARDS**

- AS/NZS 4024 Safety of Machinery.
- AS/NZS 4240 Series Remote Control Systems for Mining Equipment.
- AS/NZS 4871.1 Electrical Equipment For Coal Mines For Use Underground General Requirements.

i) ISO 13766 Earth-moving machinery – Electromagnetic compatibility.

j) ISO 13849-1 Safety of machinery – Safety related parts of control systems – Part 1: General principles for design.

NSW TRADE & INVESTMENT– MINE SAFETY PUBLICATIONS

a) MDG 15 Guideline for Mobile and Transportable Equipment in Mines.

b) MDG 1010 Risk Management Handbook.

c) MDG 1014 Guide to Reviewing a Risk - Assessment of Mine Equipment and Operations.

d) MDG 5001 Guidelines for the Design of Remote Control Systems for Mining Equipment.

e) MDG 5004 Study of Risky Positioning Behavior of Operators of Remote Control Mining Equipment.


g) Mine Safety Management Plan Workbook.
FEEDBACK SHEET

Your comment on this guideline will be very helpful in reviewing and improving the document.

Please copy and complete the feedback sheet and return it to:

Senior Inspector of Electrical Engineering
Mine Safety Operations
NSW Trade & Investment
PO Box 344
Hunter Region Mail Centre,
NSW, 2310
Fax: (02) 4931 6790

How did you use, or intend to use, this guideline?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

What do you find most useful about the guideline?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

What do you find least useful?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

Do you have any suggested changes to the guideline?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

Thank you for completing and returning this feedback sheet